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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2726 
S. T. MASSEY, Plaintiff, 
versus 
LUTHER C. ,JONES, FRANKLIN D. ROBINS, AND 
,JONES AND ROBINS, INCORPORATED, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPER8EDEA8. 
To the Honorable Chief ,lustire and the Justices ·of the Su-
preme Oou,rt of Appeals of y,i,rginia.: 
Your petitioner, S. T. Massey, respectfully represents that 
he is agg-rieved by a certain final judgment of the Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, entered on the six-
teenth day of November, 1942, wherein the said court sus-
tained the demurrer of the defendants as to the first count 
of his notice of motion; sustained the plea of the statute or' 
limitations tendered bv the said defendants as to the second 
count of his said notice of motion; and entered judgment for 
the said defendants, in an action at law wherein your peti~ 
tioner was plaintiff and Luther C. .Jones, ] 1ranklin D. 
Robins, and Jones and Robins., Incorporated, were defend-
ants. 
ST~TEMENT OF THE CASE. 
From the accompanying recorcl, it will appear that this was. 
an action, by notice of motion for judgment, for insulting 
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words under the Virginia Statute (Code 1919·, sec. 5781), al-
legedly spoken. by the snid defendants, Luther C. Jones and 
Franklin D. Robins; individually, as· agents for each other, 
and as agents for the defendant, '-Tones & Robins., Incorpo-
rated, and was based upon oral and written communications 
· alleged to be false and defamatory and under said statute 
to constitute insulting words within the purview '1<thereof, 
2* and to have been spoken during the course of a certain 
chancery suit under the style of ·S. T. Massey against 
Franklin D. R1Jbfris and. others, then depending before the 
Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, and later 
reduced to writing, and printed in the record of said chancery 
cause before this Court, Rl~cord No. 2468, and a certain other 
slanderous matter alleged to have been spoken in the City 
of Rfohmond on or about the .... day of November, 1939,. 
to one C. E. Featherstone, hy Luther C. Jones., individually, 
and as ag-ent for the other defendants. 
The allegedly libellous matt~r is set forth in the notice of 
motion as follows : 
"During the year 1931 Mr. Massey became financially in-
volved with Massey Builders' Supply Corporation, whereby 
he had overdrawn his account in excess of $10,000.00 during 
WHl and the early part of 1932, and Mr. Massey, with 107 
shares of stock, Mr. Robins with 70 shares of stock, and my-
self with 70 shares of stock, ]1elcl a controlling interest in the 
M a.ssey Builders' Supply Corporation. "\Vl1en it was dis-
covered that this shorta.ge occur~·ed. wllich was during· thei 
audit for the vear 1931. T discm;sed t]1e matter fully with 
Mr. Robins and Mr. Massey, and persuaded Mr. Robins to 
p;o alon~; with me at a stockholders' meeting to save Mr~ 
Massey harmless of any suit that might be brought that would 
involve him in any criminal affair.'' 
(Meaning and intending to be believed that the plaintiff' 
'deliberately, fraudulently, and by theft attempted to wreck 
his business to his own personal profit, and that as a result 
thereof, that the plaintiff was facing arrest and criminal' 
prosecution, with the inference tl1a.t plaintiff hnd committed 
~ crime.) 
And further : 
'' * * * covering a part of the funds which he· nad withdrawn 
from the Company witl1out consent or approval or any of the, 
officers or directors.'' ·" 
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(Meaning· and intending it to be believed that the plaintiff 
fraudulently withdrew from his company, without proper ap-
proval, certain funds ; that he was a common em'bezz1er a.nd 
unfit and untrustworthy to deal with the public.) 
And further : 
'' A. Mr. Sands, at the time he overdrew his account, .due 
to the family connections and my associations with Mr .. 
Massey, and it being· the first time that I knew be had ever 
been financially involved, I felt it was my sole duty to stand 
by him, and I did so, and persuaded my associate., Mr .. Robins, 
to do likewise, somewhat under protest. I think the record 
will indicate in the voting at this meeting that Mr. Robins 
and myself and Gordon Maynard and Bob lt,rye were the only 
people who stood by Mm. All the, other people were bitterly 
opposed to my shielding him in this affa.ir. 
3• •"Q. You spoke in reference to, in yonr initial testi-
mony, something· about some criminal responsibility of 
his. What do vou have reference to in that connection Y 
'' A. Well, I do not think he had any right to take the Com-
pany's money to the extent of $10,000.00 without the consent 
of anybody and use it, and I tl1ink the other stockholders 
thought that I1e was criminally liable.'' 
(Meaning and intending it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff maliciou~ly and intentionally committed a crime, 
whereby it was neces~ary that Luther C. Jones persuade his 
associates to shield him from criminal prosecution, that due 
to the plaintiff's actions he had committed a crime and was 
lin ble to criminal prosecution, and that plaintiff was so guilty 
that it was with difficulty that he so persuaded Mr. Robins., 
and that the other p~ople were bitterly opposed to him so 
shielding him. That he embezzlecl, and used to his own profit, 
$10,000~VO of' the money of the Corporation, and that- the 
stockholders thereof thought him a c-riminal.) 
And further: 
'' • • • and not until it was conclusively shown to me· that 
Mr. Massey wa.s trying to double-cross me did I have any 
feeling· otherwise.'' · 
(Meaning and intending it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff is a fal~ifier and a double-crosser and not a proper 
person to .be entrusted with the affairs of others or a cor-
poration.) 
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· And further : 
('The minority stockholcfors thought so, anyway (that plain-
tiff was a criminal) and they wanted to prosecute him." 
And further: 
···''A. I have no desire to prosecute him now. I am still 
100 per cent for him and for the .Massey Builders' Supply 
Corporation, but I think it would disturb you if youwere put 
in the same position, to tl1ink that when you had stood by a 
man in the trouble that he was in, that he would late1· double-
cross you and try to get control of the Company and throw 
i.t in a different direction.'' 
· (-Meanin~· and intending- it to be believed that the plaintiff' 
had committed a crime for which he could be prosecuted; 
that plaintiff was i.n such trCluble tllat it was nec~ssary that 
he needed to be shielded and stood by; and again reiterated 
that plaintiff was such a person as would double-cross and 
defraud a friend and relative and attempt to maliciously and 
fraudulently gain control of his Company for ulterior pur-
poses.) 
And further: 
'' A. Mr. Sands, :Mr. Massey suggested that cut in his salary, 
but what it was, Mr. Massey realized that he was largely re-
·sponsible., even though we were in a depression, for the finan-
,cial condition that the Company was in through those lean 
· years, having depleted its capital by some $10,000.00 witl1-
4~ out anybody's consent or knowledge. *This is a just and 
honest. debt. It is composed of money that he took from 
tl1e Company without anybody's con~ent,and of merchandise-
he took from the Company, ancl from the standpoint o:f right 
and justice there is no reason why he should not pay it.'' 
(1\tieaning· and intending it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff had, through theft, weakened the financial condition 
of his Corporation; that l1e hnd maliciously and fraudulently 
depleted his capital by $10,000.00 witl1out the knowledge or· 
consent of anyone; that he was an embezzler, thief, .and a 
common crook; that plaintiff avoids an honest obligation; 
tlmt he has no honesty in him and that he does not. recognize-
right and justice in his dealings with othor· people.} . . 
And further : 
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'' * _* * In the early part of 19'32, after we 'had ,attempted · 
to clarify or satisfy the financial difficulties of Mr. Massey 
pertaining to Massey Builders' S~pply Corporation, Mr. 
Rribins a.nd Mr. Frye -nnd Mr. Niassey and ·myself entered .into 
a certain agreeme.nt that we ·:would stand together in :the 
voting of our stocks so long as be ·proprrly conducted himself 
"fith the Corporation.'' · 
(Meaning· and intending it to be -believed thereby that the 
plaintiff had deliberatel~r caused :financial difficulties of the 
Corporation; that be could not be trusted to conduct himself 
or his ·-business., that he could not be 1~elied upon without be-
ing watched over and supervised ; .and that he was not worthy 
of confidenc·e and re:.;pcct due a gentleman and business ·man 
in his position ; that 1m maliciously and wilfully ignores ·the 
principles of rig·ht and fair dealin~, honest management, and 
fair play; that he misrepresents the facts, and ;has been and 
is unreliable.) 
.And :further : 
''Q. You were present when 'Mr. 'L. :(t Jones ,testified with 
reference to that trammction were . you not? 
''A. I was. · 
'' Q. Was his statement correct! 
'' A. Tt·was. 
·'<~. And clo you subscribe fo it ~as your ·own testimony? 
'"1\.. I do:" ·, 
{'Meaning· ·and :jntending it to be· helfovod thereby that 1the 
plaintiff. ha.d cleliberat('.)ly, fraudulently, and 1by ;.theft at-
temp~ed to defraud the creditors ·and stockholders of the 
Ma.ssey Builders' 'Supply Corporation fo his · own ·personal 
benefit and· profit; that the plnint.itJ ,,v1ts facing- arrest cand 
criminal prosecution for the reason that plaintiff ·.had com-
mitted a. crime,; that the plaintiff wai.:; a.n embezzler, unfit and 
µntrustworthy to ·handle the affairs ,of a co·rporation and to 
generally· deal with the public; that the plaintiff intentionally 
c.mnmitted such ·a •:!rime as to make it ,necessarv that he :be 
1?hi_eldecl to preYent ·arrest and being sent to the ;penitentiary; 
that the plaintiff fold en1bezzled -to ibis own use $10,000.00 in 
money:of·tpe ·Massey .Bu'.ilders' ·Sup1ily ·Oorpo1•a.tion; that 
5• the plaintiff was a falsifier, a ·*double.;.crosser, -that ·he 
wa.s dishonest and an ·unfit person fo deal with the public 
anq ~at he could not he relied upon_ or ~ntrusted wi~h ~he 
affairs ·a:nd fundff'of othe1·s.) ·- · · · · 
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And further: 
"In 1932 Mr. MassJv was in default to the extent of about 
$10,000.00 to this eorporation of.wl1ich he was President and 
General Manager. The minority stockholders were seeking 
not only the recovery of that indebtedness for the corpora-
tion but were also tlueatening criminal prosecution of Mr .. 
Massey. It was through efforts of Messrs .• Jones and Robins 
that Mr. Massey was ena.bled to aYoid such action (R., p. 
128)." 
·. (Meaning and intending tl1ereby that it should be believed 
that the plaintiff had committed a criminal offense and was 
facing arrest and C'.riminal prosecution from whic~ l1e was 
saved throug·h the efforts and offices of said defendants.) 
And further : 
'' S. T. Massey is a erook; that he committed such a crime 
that I ( the said Lutl1er C. Jones) have been forced to save 
him from the penitentiary., and that 1S. T. :Massey runs around 
· with women, and that I can and will prove it." 
PLEA.DINGS AND TRIAL PROCEDURE. 
The notiee of motion was by consent of all parties t~eated 
by the Court below as having incorporated therein the ~ntire 
record in said former cause (R. 2468), and by like cons~nt to 
contain two counts, the first dealing with words spoken and 
published in the course of said chancery cause, and the sec-
ond dealing· with the other matter published on a .... day 
. of November, 19·39 (M. R., p. 17). 
The defendants severnllv filed demurrers to the notice of' 
motion, which several demi1rrers stated their ~rounds identi-
cally to be: 
1. The said notice of motion for judgment attempts to join 
in one action several distinct causes of action. for some of 
which the said Luther C. ,Jones (]1ra11klin D. Robins, and/or 
,Jones & Robins, Inc.) is not allegwl to qe liable. 
2. That the said notice of motion shows on its face that 
all allegations relating· to certain depositions and court rec-
ards are privileg·ed and therefore eannot be the basis for a 
cause of action. (!.f. R.., pgs.- 13, 14, and 15.) 
And the same being duly argued, the eourt being of opinfolll 
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that the various allegedly libellous matters occurring in the 
course of said chanc_ery suit of Massey v. Robins, and 
6'"' contained in the reoord •thereof before this court (R. 
2468), were privileged as having been spoken in the 
course of a judicial proceeding, sustained the said demurrers 
to the first count of the notice of motion ( l\L R., pg. 17). 
Thereafter the defendants severally filed pleas of the stat-
ute of limitations and a. plea of justification· to the second 
count of the notice of motion to which pleas the plaintiff re-
plied generally. 
An issue having been joined, and neither party desiring a 
jury and agreeing· that all matters of law and fact should be 
submitted to the court for its determination, by consent of 
nll partiee, the said cause was heard upon the sole issue of 
the statute of limitations, and the court being of the opinion 
that the several pleas of the Rtatute of limitations were valid, 
sustained the same, entering up judgment for the defendant 
(M. R .. , pg. 18), which is the judgment complained of. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF' ERROR. 
The sole assignments of error as will appear from. the rec-
ord, are: 
1. The Court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the sev~ 
eral def cndnnts to the notice of motion, count I, on the ground 
that the allegedly libellous matter was absolutely privileged 
because published in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
. ~- The Court erred in sustaining the plea of the statute. 
of limitations to the allegations of the notice of motion, count 
II. 
For the convenience of the Court we ~.onsider the various 
assignments of error mentioned seriatin,,: 
1. The cnurt erred in sustni'Y1ing the demurrers to the no-
tice of motion on the ,qround that the alle.qedly libellous mat-
ter was absolutely privileged becm.tse pitblished in, the course 
o.f a jitdicial proceeding. 
At the outset it appears necessary to discuss absolute privi-
lege of matter spoken or published in a judicial proceeding. 
There are two g·eneral lines of authority in this country on 
that point. Some states follow the so-called English Rule 
which holds : 
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"' Th~ rule in England-Though the early English 
7* •cases required the testimony of a witness to be rele-
vant or pertinent to the matter in issue in order to render 
it privileged, it is now well settled in England that judges, 
parties, counsel and witne8ses are absolutely exempt from 
liability to an action for defamatory words published in the 
course of judicial proceedings.'' (Newell, Libel and Slander, 
Section 517.) 
While another line of cases follows a modification of this 
~ule~ as stated in the same work: 
'' A somewhat diffe1~ent rule obtains in most of the United 
States, where tl1e absolute privileg·e pMtects a witness against 
prosecution for defamatory words spoken in tl1e course of a 
judicial proce()ding: when such words are pertinent and ma-
terial to the subject of inquiry,: or in response to the ques-
tions, irrespective of malice or falsity.'' (Newell, Libel and 
Slander, Section 535.) 
Virgfoia, in the case of Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618 
(Special Court of Appeals, 1927), and in tl1e case of Light1ie1· 
v. Osborn, 142 Va. 19 (1925), has eommitted herself to this 
modified rule and for such reaf:on t]1e rule applicable in the 
instant situation appears to be as stated above: 
· '' .A:bsolute privilege protects a witness ap;ainst pror:;iecu-
tion for defamatory words spoken in the course of a judicial 
proceeding, when such words are pertinent and material to 
the subject of inquiry, or in response to the question., irre-
spective of malice or falsity." 
In applying this rule, tl1ere is a s]mrp distinction apparent-
between a case in which the allegedly libellous ma.tter goes 
to the essence of the ca~e in !he pleacl~ngs, as in the Ratcl-iff e 
case, supra, and a case 111 w]nch such libellous matter gratuit-
ously flows from the mouth of a witne~s under examination, 
and deals with matter not germane to the issues raised in the 
pleadings, as in the Li,qhtn~er case, supra. 
The foundation for this distinction reRts on the evident 
.fact that where a party allegedly has committed an act or 
acts of despicRble character, such as would give rise to a 
cause of action against llim in another, to pr~yent such other-
from stating such reprehensible conduct in l1is 'pleadings un-
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der threat of an action for libel, would be to stifle and op-
press justice. Therefore., wide latitude is given in a determi-
nation of the question of relevancy and/or pcrtiuency, where 
the pleading·s are concerned. 
8* *On the other hand. where such matter is not. set out 
in pleading-s or directly giving rise to a cause of action, 
or is not necessary for the pleading·s thereof properly, but 
merely brought out gratuitously in testimony in an effort to 
smear the character· of a party, no such rule of reason can 
or should exist. 
The learned judge below ap,parently lost sight of such dis-
tinctions and proceedeq. upon the belief tha.t the Ratcliffe case 
modified one ruling in the lii,,qhtne-r ca.c:e to an extent where 
the bars of discretion were thrown down and the strict rule 
applica:ble. In the application of this rule, we find no appar-
ent conflict between the decision in the Ratclitf e case., holding 
that in a petition to an elec-tion contC!Rt, alleged misconduct of 
one of the judg·es of election was germane and relevant, anc.l 
hence absolutely privileged because it alone, if substantiated, 
could serve as a bash; for the relief sought in the petition, 
and that of the Li,qhtnP-r case, l1olding that a charge of short-
ag·e in accounts and trickery, when brought out by a witness 
in his examination in a chancery suit for an injunction, was 
not pertinent or relevant to the issues, and was not abso-
lutely privileged. . 
It is the earnest contention of appellant that the holding in 
the Lightner ca.c;e is sound, and thnt such holding should gov-
ern and should be applied to the case at bar, under the facts~ 
with due reference to tl1e pleadings herein, the character of 
the suit of Robins v. Massey, R. 2468, and the nature of the 
libellous matter, together with the circumi;tances of its pub-
lication. 
It will be noted that we have 11ere no such situation as ex-
isted in tbe Ratcli:tf e case, where the allegedly libellous mat-
ter went to the very root or foundation of the judicial pro-
ceeding in which it was set out, and was of necessity alleged 
in the pleadings as a foundation for the relief prayed. On 
the contrary, the pleading-s in the cai;;e of Bobin.c; v. Massey 
(R. 2468), gave no I1int of any foundation on which such a 
charge could rest> and the scurrilous matter is found solely 
in- the testimonv. It is difficult to conceive of a situation 
more strikingly similar on the facts to that •obtaining in 
·wl< the Li.qhtner case than that· whiP.h exists in the case now 
presented. In ench case the alfogcdly libellous matter 
was spoken in t11e course of a prior chancery suit for an in-
junction by·one of the parties litigant as a witness in his own 
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behalf; in each case the allegedly libellous matter fails to 
support any issue raised in the pleadingi:3 and serves to sup-
port no material allegation of fact set out therein; in each 
case the nature of the charge is identical, that of thievery 
or shortage in the accounts of the plaintiff with his employer; 
and in each case the alfogedlv lihellons matter came into the 
recor~ solely to besmircli'"°tbe" cliaraeter of the adversary. 
Under such striking similarity, it is respectfully urged that 
the Lightner case is on all fours with the case now before the 
Court and that the Ratcliffe case has no factual similarity 
to it. It will be noted in this connection that the Ra,tcliff e 
case was decided by the Special Court of Appeals at a later 
elate than the Lightner case, and does ·not in any way disturb 
the rule laid down ·by this court in its prcdocessor, but on 
the contrary, adopts 'it, 3nd quoteR the opinion of .Judge V{est 
in the former case with approval, as follows: 
"Lightner's statements while testifying in the chancery 
suit were privileged only insofar as tbey were pertinent and 
material to the issue raised therein.'' Pennick v. Ratcliffe,. 
149 Va. 618, a.t 633. 
A comparison of the reasoning of ,Judge vV est in tbe-
Li_qhtner case with that of tTudge Holt in the Ratcliffe case 
c:m best be made by quoting ::it some length from their re-
spective opinions. 
,Judge West says in the Li,(Jhtner r.ase, 142 Va. 19, at_ 23, 24: 
"It is contended that wliat occmrocl in the chancerv suit 
and the statements made in the frial of that case were· abso-
lutely privileg-ed, and the evidence of the plaintiff, in the 
instant case, that Lightner, while testifying in the chancery 
snit, repeated the d1arg·e be had previou~ly made as to plain-
tiff's shortag"e, was inadmissible for the purpose of showing 
malice. 
'' Lightner 's statements while testifying in the chancery 
suit were privileg·cd only in so far as they were pertinent 
tmd material to the issue raised the1·r.in. 
''In Ne,vell on Slander and Ljbel (2d ed.) 424, •para-
10* graph 27., this is said : , 
'' 'And the same doctrine is g;enerallv J1elcl in the American 
eourts, with the qunlification as to parties, counsel and wit-
nesses, that their statements made in the cowse of an action 
must be pertinent and 1material to tlie case. 'r.he qualification 
of the Eng·lish rule is adopted in order that tne protectfon 
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given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administra-
tion of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath 
which to graitfy private malice. <Italies ours.)' 
'' The bill in the chancery suit was a pure bill for an in-
junction, the only issue being whether Osborn had violated 
his contract not to enter into competition, directly or indi-
rectly, with Lig·htner Publishing Corporation ·within a period 
of :five years, and not to accept employment with any com-
petitor or competing publisher. The issue involved did not 
warrant the statement as to Osborn's 'shortage' or that he 
while in the defendant's emplov was 'robbing our customers'. 
As said by Newell, at. page 42·5 : "'· 
" 'The privilege is limited and that limit is this: That 
a party or counsel shall not avail himself of his situation to 
g-ratify private malice by uttering· slanderous expressions, 
either against a party, witness or third person, which have 
no relation to the cau~e or subject matter of the inquiry.' '' 
And Judge Holt says in the Ratcliffe. case, 149 Va. 618, at 
635, 636: 
"In the lig·ht of the foregoing statements of the law were 
the offending charges material, relevant or pertinent to_ the 
relief that mip:ht have been legitimately soug·ht under the 
.petition into which they were incorporated? We think they 
were. They were pertinent as a primary proposition and 
our judgment here is f ortifiecl by the fact that they must be 
so construed whenev~r the matter is in doubt. Public. policy 
demands that within all reasonable limits a litigant should 
haYe the right to state hii;; case as he sees it. · 
"The election returnR, upon their face, showed that there 
was a. tie vote. Petitioners charge that Mr. Ratcliffe was 
a. school trustee. As sucl1 he wai;; in a position of influence 
when contracts for the transportation of children were to be 
placed. It is also said that he wa8 a judge of election, and 
that he attempted to bribe a voter by an offer to give him a· 
contract for this tramiportation if he would vote for Saunders . 
. Improper conduct was also eharged against other judges of 
election. If these facts were to be eRta:blished, no trial judge 
would decline to order a recount. This much seems once to 
have been conceded. At the conference of counsel in Octo-
ber the substantive right to a recount was not questioned. 
Their differences dealt only with matters of procedure, and 
rules to be followed wl1en it was liad, though of course other 
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matters than the alleged misconduct of Ratcliffe were doubt-
less also in mind. It is not easy to imagine a circumstance 
which would place returns under g·reater suspicion than to 
show tlmt the judge who made them had been a.ttempt-
11• ing. •to bribe the voters. One who would bribe a voter 
would falsify a count. The lea~t that a court could do 
would be to verify it by a recount. If corruption on the part 
of judges of election in connection with their official duties 
is not relevant to an investigation and recount, wha.t would 
be? 
. ''For the purposes of relevancy we must assume the charges 
of corruption to be true, howeve~ false they may have been 
in fact. '11he law of the case is not changed by the facts that 
these charges are in reality false, and that 1\fr. Ratcliffe is an 
upright gentleman, nor by the further facts that they were-, 
made maliciously and with full knowledge of their untruth-
fulness, .if such was the ca.se.'' · 
It must be seen 'by such comparison that tbe rule of law ' 
adopted in the two ca.ases and the application· of such rule is 
fundamentally the same, the only difference being that in the- · 
former case the issue made by the pleadings failed to support 
the alleged slanderous statements sufficiently to make them 
;privileged; and in the latter case, the allegedly slanderous 
statements were themselves a pnrt of the pleaded issue before 
.the court, and as such must neces~arily have been pertinent 
to such issue and as s;uch absolut~ly privileged. 
It .therefore appear.s that the sole point involved in this 
:assignment of error calls for the answer to one question: ~ 'Is 
the Lightner case the correct statement of the Virginia Rule 
on .the question of privilege of matter published in the testi-
mony of a judicial.proceeding, or has such rule been.narrowed 
by the Ratcliffe case to a point where gra..tuitous slander from 
the witness stand is granted the sumo protection by way of' 
.privilege as statements pleaded as a part of an issue triable· 
in such a proceeding?'' 
'l'he answer to such question i~. we arc convinced, that it 
was never the intention of the Special Court to ·infringe in 
any· way on the rule of the Liglttnm· case or to cast doubt on 
the application thereof; that the rule therein laid down is 
still the law of this Statn; ancl that no greater freedom of 
expression from the witness stand exists now than existed' 
under the decision in the Li,qhtr,.er r:a.c:e. 
· An examination of the record in the case of Robins v~. 
J.lfassey, before this Court (R 2468), discloses such con-· 
.12* troversy to have *been fundamentally concerned with 
an alleged· contract of hypothecation whereby Massey 
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pledged fifty-five shares of stock in Massey Builders' Supply 
Corporation to secure certain indebtedness due Jones or· 
Robins during the year 1.932, which indebtedness Massey al-
leged to be nothing, and .Jones and H,obins, and Jones & 
Robins, Inc., their successor, allegecl to amount to a substan-
tial figure. Jones and Robins and .Jones & Robins~ Inc., held 
this stock, and were, as Massey alleged, about to sell same, 
and therebv to dest.rov j\fosscv's control of the Massev Build 
ers' Supply Corporation. · · " . 
The pleading·s consist of bill of complaint, alleging the 
ranse of action and with prayer for injunction to preclude 
sale of said stock, and ·for an accounting of the debt secured 
thereby, joint and several answer of the defendants, deny-
in~ in large part the allegations of the bill of complaint, cross 
bill of .Tones & Robins, Inc., seeking settlement of its account 
with Massey,: and cross bill of Robim, seeking an adjudica-. 
tion that ten of the fifty-five shar~s of stock belonged to him 
by virtue of far.ts and ~o-reements allegP.d therein. 
N owl1ere in any of tl1ese pleadinp:s is there an allegation of 
fact touclling, even in the most indirect fashion, the conduct 
of Massey as Pre~ident and l\fanag-er of the Corpora.tion. No-
w here in the prayers for relief in the pleadings is there a 
claim based on Massey's conduct of the corporate business. 
Nowhere wa~ his c.haracter put in issue. 
It must therefore be conceded that no foundation exists in: 
the pleadi1;1gs upon whic4 it could possibly be claimed the 
"tatements serving as tbe bnsis of the instant action could 
rest or to which the same bear any relationship of relevancy 
or. pertinency. . · · 
If such be true, thC:·n it necessarily follows that such slan-
derous statements, briuginp: into the testimony as they do a 
question involving the morals and character of Massey, a mat-
ter not a-ermane to the issues made ,by the pleadings, could 
have been solely to smear the character of the complainant, 
MaRsey, and to gratify spite and ill will on the pa1·t of 
13* the defendants, Jones, Robins •and Jones and Robins, 
Incorporated~ anrl if such be RO, then such lallooiiage fails 
of privilege and is actionable. 
We therefore earnestly contend that the judge below erred 
in bis applic>ation of the principles of these two cases to the 
peculiar facts of the in~t~nt case, lost sight of the elemental 
factual differences existing between the.Ratcliffe case and the 
instant case, and the absolute factual similarity existing be-
tween tbe Li,qhtner case and the- i_nstant case;· that the rule 
as applied in the LightnPr r.atM is the application which should 
have been made in tlJe instant case·; and that the allegedly 
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slanderous :tnatter set out in the notice of motion was neither 
germane, relevant, nor pertinent to the pleaded issues in the 
case of Robitis v, Massey (R, 2468), and as such was not abso-
lutely privileged and could form the basis of this .action. 
IL 
· ·The court erred in sustaining fhe plea o.f the statute of 
lirnitatiotis to the count No. f of the notice of motion. 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, your petitioner respectfully urges 
. 1. That the learned .Judge below committed gra.ve error in: 
liis ruling· thnt the instant caRe fell within the prohibition of 
the case of Penick v. Ratcliff'e, siivra, and tlmt the allegedly 
libellous matters were absolutely privilege as having been 
spoken in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
2. That the case presented is on all fours with the case of 
:Lightner v. Osborn: supra, and falls completely within the! 
:\}olding thereof. 
3. That no pleaded issue or a11ega.tion in the case of Robins· 
y. Massey: supports or iA supported by the allegedly slan-
derous matter., nor is snch matter germane or pertinent or· 
-re]evant to any proper subjrct of inquiry therein. 
4. That the alleg·edlv slanderous statements of the defend._ 
ants are not privileged heeause tl1ey represent gratuitous ef--
forts on tl1e part of the defendants to g·ratify private spite• 
and malice. 
14* •Your petitioner therefore respectfully pra.ys for 'a: 
writ of error and super.~edeas to the judgment re:-µdered· 
by the trial court sustaining ihe Revera} demurrers to the· 
notice of motion, and suRtaining the several pleas of the sta.t-
nte of limitations, and in entering· judg1nent for the defend:... 
ants. 
Counsel for petitioners desire to state orallv the reasons· 
for reviewing: this judg'IIlent of the trial court and hereby· 
.adopt this petition for a writ of error and supersedeas as 
their opening brief in support of t.llis petition. 
Notice that this petition would be filed with the -Clerk oi 
the Supreme Court of A ppe_als of Virginia at Richmond on 
the 13th day of March, 1943, and a copy of this petition for· 
~ writ of error and SUtJP-rsedeas was delivered in person to· 
S~ T~ Massey v. I!Jutlier· 0. J'Ones, etc~ : 1~~ 
Norman L. Flippen and Archibald G. Robertson, counsel for 
'the defendants in error on the 1Hth day of March, 1943. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. T. M:ASSEY,. 
By ALEX...i\.NDER H. SANDS, 
.A.menican Building,. Hfohmond,. Virginia. 
ED"W ARD A. MA~S:,. JR.,r 
American Building, Richmond, Virginia. 
A copy of the for.egoing petition1 for a w:rit of error and 
swpersedeas received this 13th day of March, 1943.. 
}•,, .... 
NOB.MiAN L. FLIPPEN, .. 
. ARC.H1BA.,fuD G. ROBERTSON,. 
Counsel for defendants in error .. 
We, Alexander H. 1Sands and Edward A. Marks, .J.r.,: attor-
neys practicing- in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 
do hereby: certify that in our opinion the1~e- is: sufficient matter 
of error in the record aceompanying this petition to render 
it proper that the judgment complained of be reviewed and· 
reversed. 
15* 1.t ALEXANDER H. SANDS; .. 
Americ.an Building, Richmond, Virginia. 
. EDWA1tD A .. MARKS., JR., 
American Building, Richmond, Virginia.. 
Received March 13, 1943. 
M. B~ WATTS; Clerk. · 
April 28; 1943:. ,v rit of err.or and, ~i::1.1,ver.sedcas awarded. bi 
the court. Bond: $300. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
. .J .. 
Pleas before the Honorable Willis D. Miller, Judge of 
the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, held 
for the said City at the Courtroom thereof in the City Hall 
on the 16th day of November, 1942. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Of.flee of the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond 
on the 11th day of May, 1942; Came S. T. Massey by coun-
sel, and filed his Notice of Motion for Judgment against 
Luther ,C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins and Jones & Robins,, 
Incorporated, defendants, which Notice of Motion for J udg-
ment is in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity ·Court of the City of Richmond .. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins,. 
Incorporated. 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Rob-
ins, Incorporated, Richmond, Virginia: 
TAKE NOTICE, that on the 29th day of May, 1942, at 
10 :00 o'clock, A. M., of that day, or as soon thereafter as this. 
motion may be heard, the undersigned, S. T. Massey, here-
inafter ref erred to as plaintiff, will move the Law 
page 2 ~ and Equity Court of the City of Richmond, at Rich-
mond, Virginia, for a judgment against you, and 
each of you, hereinafter referred to as defendants, for the~ 
sum of $50,000.00, in compensation for certain damages sus-· 
tained by the plaintiff and caused by the defendants as here--
inafter set forth, to-wit: 
That the plaintiff for a long time before, and at the com-· 
mencing of the g-rievances and wrongs by the defendants,, 
hereinafter complained of, had been, was,. and still is; Presi:-
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dent ot the Massey Builders' Supply Corporation, in the City 
of Richmond, Virginia; that he had used, exercised and car-
ried on his business as President and General Manager of 
the said corporation with great credit and reputation; that 
throughout such years in said position as President of said 
corporation and as a business man he had established, built 
up, and maintained a profitable business, and a reputation 
among contractors, builders, material men, and the building 
trade in general, and particularly a high and respected per-
sonal reputation; that the said plaintiff, as such business 
man and dealer in building materials, had many customers, 
many friends, and a large personal following among the build-
ers, contractors, carpenters, brick and concrete workers, and 
the building and construction trade in general; that the plain-
tiff has- honestly, loyally, anrl satisfactorily, over a great 
many years, exercised great care and has always taken gTeat . 
pride in his '.reputation and in the practice and plying of his 
chosen business and profession; that he highly prized his 
. clientele, and particularly his personal friends in 
page 3 ~ the building trade, and that the plaintiff had al-
ways, in dealing· with such trade and with others 
with whom he came in contact, stressed as a first considera-
tion and a general policy, fair dealing, honesty, respect and 
courtesy ; and 
. That in the month of September, 1939, plaintiff filed a chan-
cery suit in the Law and Equity Court of the City of Rich-
mond, wherein he sought to secure the adjustment of cer-
tain matters and accounts between 11imself and the def end-
~mts herein, as well as to secure possession of a certain stock 
certificate in the Massey Builders' Supply Corporation, over 
which one of the defendants had acquired possession, and as 
to which said defendants had asserted claim or interest by 
virtue of an alleged assignment, and in which suit the plain-
tiff sought judgment of the Court and agreed to abide by the 
decision thereof in the adjudication of such rights as were 
cognizable in such controversy. 
And the plaintiff says that durinP; the pendency of this 
aforementioned chancery cause the defendants, Luther C. 
Jones, Franklin D. Robin~, and Jones & Robins, Incorporated, 
the latter being a corporation organized and chartered by 
the State Corporation Commission at the instance of said 
Jones and Robins, who jointly then and now hold the entire 
stock, did at various and sundry times, during the takin~ 
of depositions in said chancery eause herein mentioned, and 
at other divers times and places, utter and publish such 
words and caused such to be transcribed and written into 
t8·- Supreme- Cour:t · of Appeals- of Virginia 
the Record, for ·the· general. public to. see an over the· country;. 
which, from their usual construction and aooepta-
page 4 ~· ti.on, are construed' as insults: an4 tend to violence' 
and· breach of peace, and are actionable _of and by 
virtue· of the statute of Virginia for such· cases made aml 
provided, such statements made and: language so used1 being 
as follows, to-wit: 
The statements of Luther C. J'Ones, made' personally for· 
himself and: on behalf of Fr.anklin D. Robins and Jones· & 
Robins, Incorporated, when testifying in the aforesaid° cause· 
on the 2nd· day. of February, 1940, and which statements were, 
subsequently again published· and declared by and on behalf 
of the defendants· during the· summer and fall of 1941 and' 
are to be found in Record No. 2468· of the Supreme Court 
. of Appeals of Virginia in the case of Robfrts v. Massey, at-
page 128; such reading as follows~ namely:· 
'' A. .. Du;ring the year· 1981 Mr. Massey became financially 
involved with the Massey Builders' Supply Corporation,. 
whereby. he had overdrawn his· account in excess of $10,000_.00 
during 1931 and the early part of 1932, and Mr. Massey; with 
107: shares of stock) Mr. Robins: with 70'- shaTes of stock; and: 
myself with 70 shares of stock, held a controlling interest in· 
the Massey Builders' Supply Corporation. When it was dis-
cove:ued1 that this· shortag·e occurred,. which· was during the 
audit for· the· year 1931, I discussed the matter fully with 
Mr. Robins and, Mr. Massey, and persuaded Mr. Robins to 
go along~ with me-at a: stockholdes' meeting to save Mr. Mas-
sey. harmless of any suit that might be brought that would 
in:volv.e him: in, any criminal affair.''· 
... (Meaning and· intending it to be believed that the- plain-
tiff deliberately, fraudulently, and by theft attempted to 
wneck his business to his own personal profit, and that as 
a result thereof, that the plaintiff was facing arrest and crim-
inal proseoution, with the inference that plaintiff had com-
mitted: a. crime.) 
And· the statement of Luther C~ ,Jones, for himself person-
ally, Franklin D~ Robins; and ,Jones &. Robins, In,.. 
page 5: r cor.porated, when testifying in the aforesaid cause 
cm the 2nd day of. February, 1940, and which state-
ment. w:as subsequently ag·ain published; and doolared by and 
on behalf' of the defendants during the summer and fall of 
1941 and is- to be found in. Record No .. 2468· of' the Supreme 
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Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of Robins v. Ma..~sey, 
~t page J51, that: 
'' * • * covering a part of the funds which he had with-
drawn from the Company without consent or approval of any 
of the officers or directors.'' 
(Meaning· and intending it to be believed that the plain-
tiff fraudulently wit:pdrew from his company, without proper 
approval, certain funds; that he was a common embezzler 
and unfit and untrustworthy to deal with the public.) 
And the statements of .Luther 0. Jones, for himself per-
sonally, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, Incor-
porated, when testifying in the aforesaid cause on the 2nd 
day of Februa1~y, 1940, and which statements were subse-
quently !lgain published and declared by and on behalf of 
the defendants during the summer and fall of 1941 and are 
to be found in Record No. 2468 of the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virg'inia in the case of Robins v. Massey, at page 
155, that: · 
. "A. lfr. Sands, at the time he overdrew his account, due 
to the family connections and my associations with Mr. Mas-
sey, and it being the first time that I knew he had ever been 
financially involved, I felt it was my sole duty to stand by 
him, and I did so, and persuaded my associate, Mr. Robins, 
to do like),Vise, s~mewhat under prote~t. I think the record 
will indi~ate in the yoting at this m~~ting that Mr. Robins 
and myself an<;! Go~·don Maynard and Bob Frye were the 
only peopl!3 who stood by him. All the other people were 
. bitterly oppos~d to my shielding him in this affair. 
;page ~ } ... Q. ):ou . ~poke. in reference to, in. y~u initial tes-
timony, somethmg about some cr1mmal responsi-
bility of his. What do you have ref ere nee to in that con-
nection? . .. 
,. A. Well, I do not think he had a~y right to take the Com-
pany's money to the extent of $10,000.00 without the consent 
of anybody and use it, and I think the other stockholders 
thought that he was criminally liable.'' 
(Meaning an.,d intending it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff maliciously and intentionally committed a crime, 
whereby it was necessary that Luther O. Jones persuade his 
associate to shield him from criminal prosecution, that due 
t(? the plaintiff's actions he had committed a crime and was 
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liable to criminal prosecution, and that plaintiff was so guilty 
that it was with difficulty that he so persuaded Mr. Robins, 
and that . the ot4er people were bitterly opposed to him so 
shielding him. That he embezzled, and used to his own profit,. 
$10,000.00 of , the money of the Corporation, and that the 
stockholders thereof thought him a criminal.) 
And the statement of Luther C. Jones, for himself, Frank-
lin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, Incorporated, when tes-
tifying in the aforesaid cause on the 2nd day of February,, 
1940, and which statement was subsequently again published 
and declared by and on behalf of the defendants during the 
summer and fall of 1941 and is to be f o-und in Record No. 
2468 of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the 
case of Robins v. M·assey, at page 156, that: · 
'' • * • and not until it was conclusively shown to me that 
Mr. Massey-was trying to double-eross me did I have any 
feeling otherwise.'' 
(Meaning and intending it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff is a falsifier and a double-crosser and not a proper 
person to be entrusted with the affairs of others or a cor-
poration.) 
· And the statement of Luther C. Jones, spElaking for him-
self, Franklin D. Robins, and ,Tones & Robins, Incorporated,. 
when testifying in the aforesaid cause on the 2nd 
page 7 ~ day'. of February, 1940, and which statement was. 
subsequently again published and declared by and 
on behalf of the defendants during the summer and fall of 
1941 and is to be found in Record No. 2468 of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia in the case of Robins v. Massey,. 
also at page· 156, that:· 
'' The minority stockholders thought so, any way, ( that 
plaintiff was a criminal) and they wanted to prosecute him.'" 
Also that found at page 156 of this published Record: 
'' A. I have no desire to prosecut.e him now.. I am still 1.00 
per cent for him and for the Massey Builders Supply Cor-
poration, but I think it would disturb you if you were put in 
the same position, to think that when you had stood by· a 
man in the trouble that he was in, that he would later double-
eross you and try to get control of the .Company and throw. 
it in a different direction." 
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(Meaning and intending· it to be believed that the plain-
tiff had committed a crime for which he could be prosecuted; 
that plaintiff was in such trouble that it was necessary that 
he needed to be shielded and stood by; and again reiterated 
that plaintiff was such a person as would double-cross and 
defraud a friend and relative and attempt to maliciously and· 
fraudulently gain control of his Company for ulterior pur-
poses.) 
.A.nd the statement of Luther C. Jones, speaking for him-
self, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, Incorporated, 
when testifying in the aforesaid cause on the 2nd day of Feb-
ruary, 1940, and which statement was subsequently again 
published and declared by and on behalf of the defendants 
during the summer and fall of 1941 and is to be found in 
Record No. 2468 of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia in the case of Robins v. Massey, at page 158, that: 
· "A. l\fr. Sands, Mr. Massey suggested that cut in his 
.salary, but what it was, Mr. Massey realized that he was 
largely responsible, cyeu though we were in a de-
page 8 ~ pression, for the financial condition that the Com-
pany was in through those lean years, having de-
pleted its capital by some $10,000.00 without anybody's con-
sent or knowledge. This is a just and honest debt. It is com-
posed of money that he took from the Company without any-
.body's consent and of merchandise I1e took from the Com~ 
pany, and from the standpoint of right and justice there is 
_no reason why he should not pay it.'' 
(Meaning and intending it to be believed thflreby that the 
plaintiff had, through theft, weakened the financial condi-
tion of his Corporation; that he had maliciously and fraudu-
lently depleted his ·capital by $10,000.00 without the knowl-
edg-e or consent of anyone; that he was an embezzler, thief, 
and a common crook; that plaintiff avoids an honest obliga-
.tion; that he has no honesty in him and that he does not 
recognize right and justi~e in his dealings with other people.) 
' ' . 
And the statement of Luther C. Jones, speaking for him-
self, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, Incorpo·rated, 
-when testifying· in the aforesaid cause on the 2nd day of Feb-
ruarv, 1940, and which statement ·was subsequently again 
published and declared by and on behalf of the defendants 
during the summer and fall of 1941 and is to be found in 
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Record No. 2468 of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia in the case of Robins v. Massey, at page 162, that: 
'' * * ~ in the early part of 1932, after we had attempted 
to clarify or satisfy the financial difficulties of Mr. Massey 
pertaining to Massey Builders Supply Corporation, Mr .. 
Robins and Mr. Frye and Mr. Massey and myself entered 
into a certain agreement that we would stand together in 
the voting of our stocks so long as he properly conducted 
himself with the Co1·poration." 
(Meaning and intending it to be believed thereby that tlw· 
plaintiff had delihetately caused financial difficulties of the 
Corporation, that he could not be trusted to conduct himself 
or his business, that he could not be relied upon without 
being watched over and supervised; and that he was not 
worthy of confidence and respect due a gentleman and busi-
ness man in his position; that he maliciously and 
page 9 ~ wilfully ignores the principles of right, fair deal-
ing, honest management, and fair play; that he mis-
represents the facts, has been and is unreliable.) 
And in addition to the above spoken, written and. published 
statements so related herein, there are to be found in' the 
aforementioned Supreme Court Record many other state-
ments and re~erences made by the said Luther C. Jones,. 
reiterating and reminding the public in such publshed Rec-
ord of the alleged criminal misdoings of plaintiff as here-
tofore mentioned by the said Luther C. Jones, meaning and 
intending it to be believed by those whom he knew would see· 
and read such in such Record that the plaintiff was untrust-
worthy of any reliance that mig·ht be placed in him; that he-
was a crooked and dishonest citizen, manager and business· 
man; that his work could not be relied upon, and that his acts,. 
both in and out of business, were crooked, reprehensible, and 
untrustworthy for the deportment of a gentleman. And the· 
plaintiff avers that each and every one of these statements· 
was maliciously and wilfully made by the said Luther C .. 
Jones, acting for himself and his associate, Franklin D. 
Robins, for the sole and very purpose of destroying public· 
confidence in said plaintiff, of wrecking his business, his ca-
reer, his future, his fortune, and his character, which said 
statements will be more particularly referred to and proven 
at a necessary time in the conduct of this case. 
And the plaintiff avers that the defendant, Franklin D .. 
:Robins, speaking for himself and for .Jones· & Robins, Incor-. 
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porated, as shown by the following language found 
pag·e 10 ~ on page 198 of the Record above referred to, did 
in express words as hereinafter rP.lated speak, 
testify and sanction each and every word of scandal and 
libel as. spoken and intended by the defendant, Luther C. 
Jones, as hereinbefore related, with the malicious and wilful 
intent to scandalize, degredate and defame the good name 
of the plaintiff, to ruin him in his business, to degrade him 
in Ms social relation with his friends, and once and for all 
to so disg-race plaintiff as to render him unworthy and un-
deserving of public confidence wherein he had enjoyed such 
reputation and for years had earned his livelihood, which lan-
guage so used and published as related by the said Franklin 
D. Robins, as found in the Record aforesaid, being as fol-
lows, to-wit: 
'' Q. You were present when Mr .. L. C. Jones testified with 
reference to that transaction were yon not? 
A. I was. 
Q. Was his statement correct? 
A. It was. 
Q. And do you subscribe to it as your own testimony? 
A. I do." 
(Meaning and intending· it to be believed thereby that the 
plaintiff had deliberately, fraudulently, and by theft at-
tempted to defraud the creditors and stockholders of the l\fas-
sey Builders' Supply Corporation to his own personal benefit 
and profit; that the plaintiff was facing arrest and criminal 
prosecution for the reason that plaintiff had committed a 
crime; that the plaintiff was an embezzier, unfit and un-
trustworthy to handle the affairs of a corporation and to gen-
erally deal with the public; that the plaintiff intentionally 
committed such a crime as to make it necessary that he be 
shielded to prevent arrest and being sent to the penitentiary; 
that the plaintiff liad embezzled to his own use $10,000.00 in 
money of the Massey Builders' Supply Corpora-
page 11 ~ tion; that the plaintiff was a falsifier, a double-
crosser, that he was dishonest and an unfit person 
to deal with the public and that he could not be relied upon 
or entrusted with the affairs and funds of others.) 
And the plaintiff avers that the defendants herein, acting 
through their counsel then appearing in the Supreme Court 
of A.ppeals of Virginia in the case of Frwnklin D. Robins v. 
S. T. Massey, reaffirmed, published and declared the. libel 
24 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
and slander, to-wit, in a reply brief filed in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia in the aforementioned case on 
November 12, 1941, they stated and caused to be printed the 
following· language, to-wit: 
"In 1932 Mr. Massey was in default to the extent of about 
$10,000.00 to this corporation of which he was President and 
General Manager. The minority stockholders were seeking 
not only the recovery of that indebtedness for the corpora-
tion but were also threatening criminal prosec.ution of Mr. 
Massey. It was through efforts of Messrs. Jones and Rob-
ins that Mr. Massey was enabled to ayoid such action (R., p. 
128).'' 
(Meaning and intending thereby that it should be believed 
that the plaintiff had committed a criminal offe11se and was 
facing arrest and criminal prosecution from which he was 
saved through the efforts and offices of said defendants.) 
And the plaintiff avers that on another occasion the de-
fendants, acting through Luther C. Jones, and further at-
tempting and designing to ruin the plaintiff in his name, repu-
tation and fortune, made a public statement to one C. E. 
Featherstone, who at the time was befriending the plaintiff 
in that he had then gone on his bond in maintaining· an in-
junction in his behalf against the defendants in the Chancery 
suit hereinbefore mentioned,· which injunction was finally 
terminated in favor of the plaintiff in said cause, at a cer-
, tain place, to-wit, namely, at the place of business 
page 12 ~ of the said C. E. Featherstone, in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, on the ........ day of November, 1939, ma-
liciously using the fallowing· language in speaking of the 
plaintiff: · 
'' S. T. Massey is a crook; that he committed such a crime 
that I ( the said Luther C. Jones) have been forced to save 
him from the penitentiary, and that S. T. Massey runs around 
with women, and that I can and will prove it.'' 
And the plaintiff avers that by reason of the words, 
phrases, and language hereinbefore severally mentioned, so 
written and spoken of and concerning the plaintiff, as afore-
said, by the defendants, he has been greatly wounded, mor-
tified, humiliated, disgraced, aggrieved and damaged in his 
said business, social intercourse and otherwise, Riid that by 
reaaon of such acts and utterances he is entitled to recov£;r 
S. T. Massey v. Luther C. J·one~, etc. 25 
and therefore demands, in accordance with the statute for and 
in such cases made and provided, damages in the sum of $50,-
000.00. 
WHEREOF judgment for the said sum, tog·ether with 
costs, will be asked at the hands of the said Court at the. time 
ancl place hereinabove set out. 
Given under my hand this 9th day of 1\fay, 1942 .. 
WM. C. ICTNG, 
ALEXANDER H. SANDS, 
Counsel. 
S. T. MASSEY, 
By Counsel. 
page 13 ~ And at another day, to-wit: At a Law and 
Equity Court of the City of Richmond, hP.ld the 
29th day of May, 1942. 
This day came the plaintiff and defendants, by counsel, 
and on the motion of the plaintiff, by counsel, it is ordered 
that this case be docketed. 
Thereupon the defendant, Luther C. Jones: filed herein a 
demurr~r in writing to the notice of motion for j~dgment 
of the plaintiff; and the defendant, Franklin D. Robins, filed 
herein a demurrer in writing to the notice of motion for 
judgment of the plaintiff, and the defendant, Jones & Robins, 
.Incorporated, filed a demurrer in writing to the notice of mo-
tion for judgment of the plaintiff. 
Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. 
DEMURRER OF LUTHER C .• JONFJS. 
The said defendant, Luther C. Jones, says that the notice 
of motion in this action is not sufficient in law and that no 
26 Supreme Court. of Appeals of Virginia 
count thereof or part thereof is sufficient in law for the fol-
lowing reasons : 
page 14 } 1. The s.a~d ~otice of .motion for ju~ginent at-
. tempts to JOm m one action several d1stmct causes 
of action, for some of which the said Luther C. Jones is not 
alleged to be liable and for others of which he is alleged to 
be liable. 
2. That the said notice of motion shows on its face that all 
allegations relating to certain depositions and court records 
are privileged and tberef ore cannot be tbe basis for a cause 
of action. 
Virginia: 
NORM ... t\.N L. FLIPPEN, 
Counsel for Luther C. Jones. 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of R,ichmond. 
S. T. Massey 
'IJ. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jone~ & Robins, 
Incorporated. 
DEMURRER OF FRANKLIN n. ROBINS. 
The said defendant, Franklin D. Robins, says that the 
notice of motion in this action is not sufficient in law and 
that no count thereof or part thereof is sufficient in law for 
the following reasons : 
page 15 } 1. The said notice of motion for judgment at-
tempts to join in one action several distinct causes 
of action, for some of-which the said Franklin D. Robins is 
not alleged to be liable and for others of which he is alleged 
to be liable. 
2. That the said notice of motion shows on its face that all 
_allegations relating to certain. depositions and court records 
are privileged and the ref ore cannot be the basis for a cause 
of action. 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
Counsel for Franklin D. Robins. 
S. T. Massey v. Luther 0. J"ones, etc. 27 
Virginia: 
In the Law and J.!1quity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. 
DEMURRER OF JONES & ROBINS, INCORPORATED. 
The said defendant, Jones & Robins, Incorporated, says 
that the notice of motion in this action is not sufficient in 
law and that no count thereof or part thereof is sufficient in 
law for the following reasons: 
1. The said notice of motion for judgment at-
page 16 ~ tempts to join in one action several distinct causes 
of action, for some of which the aaid Jones & 
Robins, Incorporated, is not alleged to be liable and for oth-
ers of which it is alleged to be liable. 
2. That the said notice of motion shows on its face that all 
alleg·ations relating to certain depositions and court records 
~re· privileg·ed and the ref ore cannot be the basis for a cause 
of acfion. 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
Counsel for Jones & Robins, Incorporated. 
page 17 ~ · .And now at this day, to-wit: .A.t a Law and 
Eauity Court of the City of Richmond, }1eld the 
16th day of November, 1942. 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys and by 
consent of all parties the Court doth consider the plaintiff's 
notice of motion as consisting· of two separate counts, the 
first of which counts deals with the matters and things stated 
and alleged to have occurred in the course of the chancery 
cause of Franklin D. Robins µgainst S. T. Massey, lately de-
termined before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
(Record No. 2468), and the second of which counts deals 
with tl1e allegedly slanderous statements made by L. C. ,Jones 
to C. E. Featherstone, respecting tl1e plaintiff, on the ..... . 
day of November, 1939; accordingly, the said notice of me,. 
tion is now so divided and so designated on its fact; and 
by like consent of all parties, by ·counsel, the record (No. 
28 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
2468) before the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in 
said chancery cause of Franklin D. Robins against S. T. 
Massey -is treated .and considered as 'having been made a 
part of the notice of motion in this case in toto ;· 
.And thereupon the defendants' demurrers to-the plaintiff's 
·notice of motion being argued, the Court being of opinion 
that the matters and things alleged in the first count thereof 
are privileged as haYing been spoken in the course of a ju· 
dioial .proceeding, on consideration whereof it is ordered that 
the said several demurrers be and they are hereby sustained 
· as to said -Count No. 1 of the notice of motion; but 
page 18 } ,the Court doth overrule the·said several demurrers 
as to,Cfount No. 2 of said notice of motion, to·wliich 
action of the Court the plaintiff, by .counsel, .excepted as to 
the Court's action in sustaining the demurrer as to the first 
eourit iOf 0the .notice of motion. 
mhereupon, the def end.ants severally tendered and filed ·a 
plea of -statute of limitations and a ·plea of ju~ti:fication to 
said Count 2 of the said notice of motion, namely, -that ·based 
upon the slanderous words alleged fo ·have 'been spoken on 
the ........... day of November, 1939, to C. E. Featherstone -~y 
L. iC. Jones ·in his -own ·right and as agent ·for :Franklin D. 
Robins and .Jones & .Robins, Incorporated, ·respecting the 
plaintiff, to which pleas the plaintiff replied generally. 
And issue being joined and neither party desiring· a jury 
and agreeing .that all matters of law and fact should be sub-
mitted :to the Court .for its determination without the inter-
vention of a jury and that judgment be given by the Court, 
and by :like consent the ,parties having -stipulated that in con-
sidering the several :pleas that the Court should first hear 
testimony and pass upon the issues raised by the said pleas 
of statute of limitations; and it being stipulated by counsel 
for :all ·parties that ithe said allegedly defamatory words were 
spoken-on a :lilank day .of November, 1939, and ·not thereafter,. 
the Count being :of opinion that the said pleas of statute of 
limitations are valid .and -should be -sustained, doth hereby 
sustain the ·same, to which action of the Court the plaintiff,. 
. by · counsel, excepted. 
page 19 ~ . .Accordingly, the Court doth adjudge that the 
said ·plaintiff recover nothing ·of the said defend-
ants, .or any ·of them, about 'his action herein, but- that the 
said defendants do ,recover and have judgment ·against the 
sai~ ·plaintiff, ·S. ~\ .Massey, ·for their c9sts by them .about 
their defense herem expended.· · . 
And the, said .plaintiff intimating :his intention of applying 
S. T. Massey v. Luther C. J·ones, etc. 29. 
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of 
errQr and supersedeas to the judgment of the Court afore-
said, and the action of the Court in sustaining the said de-
murrers as to the .first count of his notice of motion,-and the 
act~on of the Court in sustaining the several pleas of the 
statute of limitations as to the second count of his said notice 
of motion, execution is suspended for a period of ninety (90) 
days provided said plaintiff, or someone for him, shall enter 
into bond with surety before the Clerk of this Court in the 
pen~lty of $100.00 conditioned according to law, within fifteen 
(15) days from the date hereof. 
page 20 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
. Incorporated. 
PLEA. 
The sa.id defendant, Franklin D. R.obins, by his attorneys 
comes and says that the supposed cause of action set forth 
in Count Number 2 of the. notice of motion for judgment in 
this case is founded upon an alleged slander or insulting 
words spoken of and concerning the said plaintiff, and that 
the said cause of action did not accrue to the said plaintiff 
at any time within one year next before the commencement 
of this action in the manner and form as the said plaintiff 
hath complained ag·ainst him. And this the said defendant 
is ready to verify. 
State of Virginia, 
ARCHIBALD G. RJOBERTSON, 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN,· 
P~ d. 
City of Rfohmond, to-wit: 
I, Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the 
City and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that Franklin D. 
Robins this clay personally appeared before me in my City 
aforesaid and made oath that the matters and things stated 
in the foregoing plea are true. 
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My .commission expires January 6, 1943. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of November, 1942. 
MARGARE.T TOLER RIDLEY, 
Notary Public. 
Commissioned as Marg·aret Toler. 
page 21 ~ Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. · 
PLEA. 
The said def elidant, Jones & Robins, Incorporated, by its 
attorneys comes and says that the words spoken of and con-
cerning the plaintiff as alleged in -Count Number 2 of the 
notice of motion for judgment in this action mentioned are 
true, and this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
State of Virginia, 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
p. d .. 
C.ity of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day Luther C .. Jones personally appeared before me,. 
Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the City 
and State aforesaid, in my City aforesaid, and made oath 
that he is the President of Jones & Robins, Incorporated, 
and as such is. duly authorized to make this affidavit, and 
further made oath that the matters and things stated in the 
foregoing plea are true. 
My commission expires January 6, 1943. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of November, 1942. 
MARGARET TOLER RIDLEY, 
CeIDDlissioned · as Margaret Toler.· 
Notary Public.'---....., 
S. 'T. Massey v. Luther C. J'ones, etc. 
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. In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. . 
~1 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. 
PLEA. 
The said defendant, Luther C. Jones, by his attorneys 
comes and says that the supposed cause of action set forth 
in Count Number 2 of the notice of motion for judgment in 
this case is founded upon an alleged slander or insulting· 
words spoken of and concerning the said plaintiff, and that 
the said cause of action did not accrue to the said plaintiff 
~t any time within one year next before the commencement 
of this action in the manner and form as the said plaintiff 
hath complained against him. And this the said defendant 
is ready to verify. · 
State of Virginia, 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERT.SON, 
NOR.MAN L. FLIPPEN, 
p. d. 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the 
City and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that Luther C. 
,Tones this day personally appeared before m_e in my City 
aforesaid and made oath that the matters and things stated 
in the foregoing plea are true. 
My commission expires January 6, 1943. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of November, 1942. 
MARGAR,E,T TOLER RIDLEY, 
Notary Public. 
Commissioned as l\farg·aret .Toler.· .. 
page 23 } Virginia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the Ci~y of ~lchmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins,- and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. · 
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PLE.A. 
The said defendant, Luther C. ,Jones, by his attorneys 
comes and says that the words spoken of and concerning 
the plaintiff as alleged in Count Number 2 of the notice of 
motion for judgment in this action mentioned are true, and 
this the said defendant is ready to verify. 
State of Virginia, 
ARCHIBALD .Q. ROBERT.SON, 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
p. d. 
City of Richmond, to-wit : 
I, Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the 
City and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that Luther C .. 
Jones this day personally appeared before me in my City 
aforesaid and made oath that the matters and things stated 
in the foregoing plea are true. . 
My commissi.on expires January. ,6, 1943. 
Given under my-hand this 11th day of November, 1942. 
MARGARET TOLER RIDLEY, 
· Notary Public. 
Commissioned as Margaret Toler. 
page 24 ~ Virginia: 
In the La~ and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporated. 
PLEA. 
The said defendant, Franklin D. Robins, by his. attorneys, 
comes and says that the words spoken of and concerning the 
plaintiff as alleged in County Number 2 of the notice of mo-
tion for judgment in this aetion mentioned are true, and this 
the said defendant is ready to verify. 
ARCHIBALD H .. ROBE.RTSON, 
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State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
I, Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the 
City and State aforesaid, do hereby certify that Franklin 
D. Robins this day personally appeared before me in my 
City aforesaid and made oath that the matters and things 
stated in the foregoing plea are true. 
My commission expires January 6, 1943. 
Given under my hand this 11th day of November, 1942. 
MARGARET TOLER RIDLE1Y, 
Notary Public. 
Commissioned as Margaret Toler. 
page 25 r Virgfoia: 
In the Law and Equity Court of the City of Richmond. 
S. T. Massey 
v. 
Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Robins, 
Incorporafad. 
PLEA. 
The said defendant, Jones & Robins, Incorporated, by its 
attorneys comes and says that the supposed cause of action 
set forth in Count Number 2 of the notice of motion for 
judgment in this case is founded upon an alleged slander or 
insulting words spoken of and concerning the said plaintiff, 
and that the said cause of action did not accrue to the said 
plaintiff at any time within one year next before the com-
mencement of this action in the manner and form as the said 
plaintiff hath complained against it. And this the said de-
fendant is ready to verify. 
State of Virginia, 
ARCHIBALD G. ROBERTSON, 
NORMAN L. FLIPPEN, 
p. d. 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day Luther C. Jones personally appeared before me, 
Margaret Toler Ridley, a Notary Public in and for the City 
34 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
and State aforesaid, in my City afore said, and made oath 
that he is the President of Jones & Robins, Incorporated, and 
as such is duly authorized to make this affidavit, and further 
made oath that the matters and things stated in the foregoing 
plea. are true. 
My commission expires January 6, 1943. 
··Given under my hand this 11th day of November, 1942. ~ 
MARGARET TOLER RIDLEY, 
Co~ssioned as Margaret Toler. 
Notary Public. 
' . 
page 26 } . I, Luther Libby, Clerk of the Law and Equity 
Court of the City of Richmond, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing is a true transcript of the record in the 
above entitled cause wherein S. T. Massey is complainant 
and Luther C. Jones, Franklin D. Robins, and Jones & Rob-
ins, 'Inc., defendants, and that the defendants had due notice 
of the intention of the plaintiff to apply for such transcript. 
- Witness my hand this 2d day of March, 1943. 
LUTHER LIBBY, 9Ierk. 
Fee for record $10.00. 
A Copy-Teste : 
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